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1968]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

operated by respondent was in physical contact with a hit and run
automobile. The supreme court, Queens County, held that the insurer
was not entitled to the jury trial requested, but, rather, to a
preliminary hearing by the court on the issue.0 9
While there is no constitutional right to a jury trial of issues
raised on a motion to stay arbitration, 7 0 Sections 1450 and 1458(2)
of the Civil Practice Act granted a statutory right to such a trial.
Although these sections were not transposed to the CPLR, the
general feeling of authors 171 and commentators,1 7 2 based on the
Second Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, was that the new arbitration provisions were not intended
to eliminate trial by jury if desirable or constitutionally required.
This seemingly clear evidence of legislative intent regarding the
right to jury trial weakens, somewhat, the arguments posed by the
court in favor of their holding, i.e., that the legislature has had
ample time to correct any alleged error and that calendar delay
demanded the decision.
NEw YORK INSURANcE LAW
Ins. Law § 167: Defense of failure to cooperate difficult to establish.
Section 167 of the Insurance Law provides that, upon the
service of notice, a judgment creditor of an insured may maintain
a direct suit against a judgment debtor's insurance company in
order to satisfy a judgment. The insured's failure to cooperate
with the insurer is a defense of the insurer to this direct action.
However, the73 burden of proving such lack of cooperation is upon
the insurer.
In Thrasher v. United States Liability Insurance Co.,'17 plaintiffs, judgment creditors of an insured, sought to satisfy their
judgments against the judgment debtor's insurer. The defendant
109 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gottlieb, 54 Misc. 2d at 185, 281
N.Y.S.2d at 598.
938 (4th
.70 Andolina v. MVAIC, 23 App. Div. 2d 958, 259 N.Y.S2d
Dep't 1965); MVAIC v. Coccaro, 40 Misc. 2d 1038, 244 N.Y.S2d 972

(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963).

171 "Although the specific provisions of sections 1450 and 1458(2)
are
omitted from the CPLR, the new arbitration provisions were 'not intended
to eliminate trial by jury if it is desirable or constitutionally required'"
4 WENsTmN, KoRN & MruER, NEw YoaK CmL PRAcrica 14101.28
(1966). See also 8 id. 7503.25; "[T]here was no intention on the part of

the draftsmen to eliminate the right to trial of the issues of the existence

of an arbitration agreement and compliance with the agreement when a
jury trial is desirable or constitutionally required."
172 7B McKnNEv's CPLR 7503, commentary 488 (1963).
173 N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(5).

M719 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d 503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967).
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insurance company set up the defense, inter alia, of the insured's
failure to cooperate. Defendant's efforts to secure its insured's
cooperation included visiting his last known address on two
separate occasions, mailing a certified letter to that address, telephoning his last known employer, visiting his old neighborhood,
and employing a process serving company to serve him with a
subpoena. The Court, nevertheless, felt that the defendant had
failed to sustain the extremely heavy burden of proving lack of
cooperation.' 7 5 Under the test set down by the Court, the insurer
must demonstrate that it acted diligently in seeking to bring about
the insured's cooperation; that the efforts employed were reasonably calculated to obtain the insured's cooperation; and, that the
was sought, was one
attitude of the insured, after his cooperation
76
of willful and avowed obstruction.
The instant case, by relying on a long line of decisions refusing to allow disclaimer of liability, 177 illustrates the rigid policy of
the State in protecting the victims of automobile accidents. Because of this rigid policy, the burden required to prove lack of
cooperation so as to disclaim liability approaches the insurmountable.

1375"Since the defense of lack of co-operation penalizes the plaintiff for
the action of the insured over whom he has no control, and since the
defense frustrates the policy of this State that innocent victims of motor
vehicle accidents be recompensed for the injuries inflicted upon them . . . ,

the courts have consistently held that the burden of proving the lack
of co-operation is a heavy one indeed."

Thrasher v. United States Liability

Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d at 168, 225 N.E2d at 508, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
276 Id.
'7 See, e.g., Amatucci v. Maryland Cas. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 583, 267
N.Y.S.2d
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(3d

Dep't

1966)

(the

insured's unexplained

disappearance

was held not to be willful and avowed obstruction) ; Rosen v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 335, 260 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1st Dep't
1965) (the insurer's efforts to locate its insured, including letters and
the use of a company investigator, were held not to be reasonable under
the circumstances); National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lococo, 20 App. Div.

2d 785, 248 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1st Dep't 1964), af'd, 16 N.Y.2d 585, 209 N.E.2d
99, 261 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1965) (the insured's disappearance was held not to be
willful and avowed obstruction); Wallace v. Universal Ins. Co., 18
App. Div. 2d 121, 238 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1st Dep't), aft'd, 13 N.Y.2d
978, 194 N.E.2d 688, 244 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1963) (the court conceded that the
insurer used reasonable efforts but, nonetheless, the insured's unexplained
disappearance was not willful and avowed obstruction).

